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There’s a thin, often 
unclear line between a riot and a 
protest. Demonstrators perform a 
tightrope-walking act, balancing 
their outrage at controversial 
events with the knowledge that a 
single misstep can lead to total 
chaos. In some countries, that 
chaos manifests itself as military 
crackdowns by the ruling 
government, the goal being to jail 
problematic opposition leaders 
and scare people out of returning 
to the streets. The U.S. has a long 
history of replacing that military 
force with the presence of local 
police, but over time that line has 
become equally blurred. One need 
only look at the events of 
Ferguson, Mo. to see that 
ambiguity in action. 
 Michael Brown was shot 
and killed by police officer Darren 
Wilson Aug. 9, 2014. The following 
day, Ferguson was flooded by 
protestors angered by yet another 
killing of an unarmed black man by 
a white police officer, and a 
peaceful candlelight vigil was held 
to honor Brown, followed by a 
night of looting and turmoil. The 
police department responded by 
sending out more than 300 officers 
in riot gear. Over the next three 
days, the country watched as 
automatic weapons outfitted with 
rubber bullets replaced batons and 
riot shields were replaced by 
Bearcats, massive armored 
vehicles designed primarily to 
resist IEDs along the streets of 
Iraq. Governor Jay Nixon called in 
the National Guard a few days 
later, and tear gas canisters 
riddled the streets as officers 
donned their gas masks.1 This 
continued for two weeks. 
 The equipment that the 
Ferguson police department 
utilized also fills the armories of 
other local police departments 
across the country and has been 
flowing there for decades. Nearly 
all of that equipment can be traced 
back to the same place: the United 
States Department of Defense. 
More specifically, it originates from 
within the Disposition 
Services department of the United 
States Government's Defense 
Logistics Agency (or DLA) and is 
distributed through a system 
known as the 1033 program. 
 
*** 
 
 Law enforcement during 
the early 1990s carried a large 
emphasis on suppression of the 
growing drug culture. With South 
American drug imports through the 
roof and urban crime experiencing 
a transition from powdered to 
crack cocaine, the “War on Drugs” 
was in full swing. It became much 
easier for criminals seeking to 
protect their drug supplies to 
purchase new, stronger weaponry, 
and as the firepower of the 
opposition grew and violent crime 
rates continued to escalate, the 
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perception that police were being 
outgunned began to spread. 
Conversely, America’s military, 
experiencing a period of relative 
peace that it hadn’t enjoyed for 
some time, was bloated with 
equipment sitting in warehouses 
and empty lots across the country. 
This equipment sat uselessly for 
years, waiting to be torn apart for 
scrap.  
 Congress devised a 
solution to both problems and 
tacked it on to the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 1990 
under Section 1208. The passage 
empowered the Department of 
Defense (DOD) to sell its surplus 
equipment and supplies to other 
federal agencies or state 
governmental departments, as 
long it didn’t cost the DOD any 
money.2 The only restriction 
placed on what equipment could 
be transferred was a requirement 
that it be useful in “counter-drug 
activities”, but this language was 
intentionally left vague in order to 
accommodate both advances in 
technology and possible changes 
in the nature of drug-related 
crimes.  
 In 1997, Congress passed 
the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1997, which 
changed Section 1208 to Section 
1033 and officially created the 
1033 program, as it is now known. 
The change widened the focus of 
the program from counter-drug 
activity to general “law 
enforcement purposes” and 
expanded access to include law 
enforcement contractors unrelated 
to the government as long as they 
had the authority to make arrests 
and charge suspects with a crime.3 
Requests related to anti-drug and 
anti-terrorism activities were given 
preference, but the change made 
it much easier for police to acquire 
heavy equipment regardless of 
intent. Control of the program was 
moved from the DOD’s Pentagon 
offices to the DLA’s National 
Program Office, which 
consolidated the existing 1033 
agreements under a more 
streamlined management system.4 
Finally, in 2009, the 1033 program 
moved to the Defense 
Reutilization and Marketing 
Service (DRMS), which was 
rebranded as the DLA Disposition 
Services Law Enforcement 
Support Office (LESO). 
 Before dealing with 
individual police departments, the 
1033 program must first enroll the 
state those departments are in. 
The governors of interested states 
must sign a Memorandum of 
Agreement (essentially a business 
contract) with the DLA and appoint 
a state coordinator. State 
coordinators are tasked with 
investigating abuses of transferred 
equipment and maintaining 
detailed records of how equipment 
is being implemented by agencies. 
These records include reports of 
misconduct or misuse of 
equipment on the part of the state, 
which are sent to the DLA. The 
DLA will investigate the reports 
and, if necessary, revoke the 
transferred equipment. 
Additionally, the DLA states that it 
regularly sends out compliance 
reviewers, members of the LESO 
staff who directly work with state 
coordinators “to ensure that 
property accountability records are 
properly maintained, minimizing 
the potential for fraud, waste and 
abuse.”5 Once the foundation has 
been set, local law enforcement 
agencies must apply for approval 
by the state coordinator and the 
LESO to join the program by filling 
out a simple, one-page 
application.  If approved, agencies 
are provided with a catalogue of all 
available equipment they can then 
apply to receive.  
Tactical vehicles (MRAPs, 
APCs, armored Humvees) are all 
covered by a one-page 
application. Aircraft (helicopters, 
small planes, surveillance crafts) 
are all covered by a one-page 
application. Watercraft (RIBs, 
patrol boats, speedboats) are all 
covered by a one-page 
application. Finally, weaponry, 
including assault rifles, pistols, 
grenade launchers and tear 
gas/pepper spray canisters, are all 
covered by a one-page 
application.6  
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Along with the simplistic 
application process, the equipment 
offered through the 1330 program 
is generally free, regardless of the 
market value. Armored vehicles 
like MRAPs can cost up to 
$600,000 to produce, but the 
military has so many left over after 
its withdrawal from Iraq and 
Afghanistan that local agencies 
can receive one for only the cost 
of transporting it.7 According to an 
NPR report, more than 600 
MRAPs have been sent to local 
law enforcement agencies within 
the past year.8 Since 2006, the 
1033 program has also distributed 
nearly 80,000 assault rifles, 205 
grenade launchers, 12,000 
bayonets, 4,000 combat knives, at 
least $124 million worth of night-
vision equipment, including night-
vision sniper scopes, nearly 500 
bomb detonator robots, 50 
airplanes, including 27 cargo 
transport airplanes, more than 400 
helicopters and more than $3.6 
million worth of camouflage gear 
and other "deception equipment."9 
These numbers are distributed 
across the country, but even with 
that in mind, they are massive.  
The LESO website proudly 
declares that the 1033 program 
has, since its inception, transferred 
more than $5.1 billion of 
equipment to law enforcement 
agencies, $4.5 million of which 
occurred in 2013 alone.10 Without 
the 1033 program, budget-
strapped local police departments 
would certainly be unable to afford 
this equipment, but the decline of 
those budgets and the layoffs that 
have followed over the past few 
years does raise the question: 
Who is all of this equipment for? 
The amount of weaponry and 
“tactical vehicles” distributed to 
police has been inversely 
correlated to the number of police 
officers for some time, so what is 
all of this gear meant to 
accomplish if there aren’t even 
enough trained officers to use it? 
Nobody seems to have an answer 
until a crisis occurs and the streets 
are filled with fancy new hardware. 
Furthermore, while 
departments must only pay for the 
price of transportation when first 
acquiring the equipment, they are 
ultimately responsible for its 
maintenance while they are in 
possession of it. The cost of 
maintaining tactical vehicles like 
helicopters and patrol boats can 
be extraordinarily high, not to 
mention the cost of training 
specialized units to properly staff 
and operate the units. Equipment 
they require is also not always 
new, so police may need to pay to 
have it repaired or turned into 
scrap. This cost/benefit imbalance 
can lead to departments returning 
equipment they have requested 
simply because the strained 
budgets that pushed them to 
acquire the gear in the first place 
don’t allow them to uphold those 
acquisitions. Such a situation is 
ineffective at accomplishing much 
of anything. 
The actual process of 
acquiring equipment is quick and 
efficient, but its simplicity could 
clearly be problematic. These are 
weapons designed to kill people 
and vehicles meant to outrun, 
overpower and contain militant 
enemies. This equipment was 
created for the military to fight 
The amount of weaponry and “tactical 
vehicles” distributed to police has been 
inversely correlated to the number of 
police officers for some time, so what is all 
of this gear meant to accomplish if there 
aren’t even enough trained officers to use 
it? Nobody seems to have an answer until 
a crisis occurs and the streets are filled 
with fancy new hardware. 
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threats to America but now it is 
being deployed to small towns 
across the country, and that is 
cause for concern. The line 
between citizen and government 
has shifted from being a badge 
and pistol to a Kevlar vest and 
tactical scope-equipped assault 
rifle, and that change is facilitated 
by a single-sided piece of paper 
submitted to an appointed 
bureaucrat who most of the public 
doesn’t know exists. That is a 
troubling evolution that sends a 
bad message to communities. 
Citizens are expected to trust their 
police departments, but the DLA 
refuses to show which agencies 
are requesting this weapons or 
vehicles and the records that are 
available in public records only go 
as far as county name.11  
Ferguson, for instance, is a 
part of St. Louis County. DLA 
records would include the total 
number of armored vehicles and 
rifles received by every police 
department within that county, of 
which there are 58, an abnormally 
large number.12 Rather than 
having access to the amounts of 
certain pieces of equipment (e.g. 
grenade launchers) their individual 
police department has requested, 
residents of Ferguson would only 
have access to a grand total that’s 
unevenly divided 58 ways and 
doesn’t include disbursements to 
the county police department of 
750 officers. Citizens must 
assume that they’re safe from both 
each other and their militarized 
police officers despite being 
generally blind to the size and 
strength of the law enforcement 
umbrella under which they live. 
The argument given by the 
government against providing 
more specific disclosure is that 
such information would put local 
departments at risk because 
criminals with knowledge of the 
police’s weaponry could escalate 
their own firepower, creating a 
severe security problem. This 
directly involves the grander issue 
of gun control in America — 33 
states allow assault weapons to be 
purchased without showing any 
form of ID or going through a 
background check as long as they 
aren’t being sold by a licensed 
dealer, such as gun show vendors. 
There are also 43 states allowing 
assault weapons to be purchased 
with any form of government ID, 
and no states limit the number of 
weapons that a household is 
allowed to have.13 While the 
public’s accessibility to weapons 
equaling the power of police 
equipment could conceivably 
present a threat to police officers, 
making militarization seemingly 
necessary, the scale of that 
militarization should be indexed to 
the hypothetical threat actually 
present in that community. There’s 
no need for police departments in 
small towns where homicides are 
practically unheard of to be 
comparable in their preparedness 
to that of urban task forces, and 
the message sent by this over-
compensation can severely harm 
the already fragile sense of trust 
between communities and their 
police forces.14 
Complicating the matter is 
the fact that private law 
enforcement groups are also 
covered by the 1033 program. 
DLA records outlining members of 
the 1033 program indicate that the 
police departments of more than 
100 different college campuses 
have enrolled in the program 
between 2000 and 2014. This 
number includes large universities, 
small liberal arts colleges, higher 
educational systems such as the 
State University of New York 
network and nonresidential 
community colleges.15 In 2013, 
Ohio State University acquired an 
MRAP equipped with a machine 
gun turret, becoming the first 
campus police department to do 
so, and Florida State University 
received an armored Humvee.16  
These acquisitions came one year 
after the University of California’s 
Berkeley campus announced 
plans to request an eight-ton 
armored truck from the DOD 
through a Homeland Security 
grant, but those plans were 
eventually scrapped in response to 
public outcry. While all three of 
these institutions have large 
populations in the tens of 
thousands, none of them have at 
any point experienced the type of 
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safety threat that these items were 
designed to deal with. In fact, no 
American university has ever 
experienced a situation that these 
items are designed and necessary 
to face. David Perry, president of 
the International Association of 
Campus Law Enforcement 
Administrators and chief of Florida 
State’s police department, told 
Politico that the school used their 
Humvee to navigate the campus 
following a flood.17 OSU uses its 
MRAP to stand guard out front of 
its football games. These may 
seem like useful applications of 
such equipment, but on an 
objective level, they are 
misapplications. These armored 
vehicles are designed to deal with 
dangerous threats from firearms 
and explosives, and simply 
bestowing them upon campus 
police departments who 
demonstrate no practical need for 
them doesn’t help build the case 
that the 1033 program’s military 
provisions are absolutely 
necessary. 
Beyond college campuses, 
militarization has recently spread 
to regional school districts. San 
Diego Unified School District 
received an MRAP in 2014 to act 
as a “medical supply vehicle” that 
could help injured students. The 
same problem emerges here as 
with the aforementioned college 
acquisitions: that isn’t the purpose 
of this equipment. Whether or not 
the district fills it with teddy bears 
as officials say they will, an MRAP 
is a piece of military hardware, and 
parents have expressed valid 
concern.18 An even more 
controversial situation has 
developed in Los Angeles, where 
the Los Angeles School Police 
Department has received three 
grenade launchers and 61 assault 
rifles, in addition to an MRAP of its 
own.19 In Texas, districts across 
the state have also jumped into 
the 1033 program headfirst. A total 
of 64 M16 rifles, 18 M14 rifles and 
25 automatic pistols were acquired 
by several of the state’s districts. 
Armored plating, tactical vests and 
15 surplus military vehicles 
accompanied the weaponry.20 All 
of these developments are plainly 
unnecessary and unpractical in K-
12 school districts, and they 
demonstrate the excessive growth 
of militarization facilitated by 
Section 1033. Just because the 
equipment is essentially free 
doesn’t mean that any 
organizations eligible to acquire it 
actually should.  
 While it’s easy to decry the 
1033 program for driving the 
militarization of even small police 
groups, there are benefits of it that 
are undeniable. In addition to the 
weaponry and tactical equipment 
provided by the DLA, the majority 
of transfers are related to office 
supplies and practical utilities. The 
LESO claims that only five percent 
of the transfers they have made 
include weapons, with vehicles 
making up less than one percent 
overall.21 Most transfers consist of 
non-tactical clothing, such as 
uniforms and outerwear, and office 
supplies. Desks, office chairs, 
computer monitors, file cabinets — 
these things are mundane and 
may seem like they should just 
appear in all administrative 
settings by divine intervention, but 
they do not. They cost money, and 
that is something that police 
departments generally lack. 
 Looking at the value of 
what the transfers consist of can 
lead observers to false 
conclusions like the belief that 
vehicles are the most commonly 
transferred items. That’s plainly 
untrue. In 2013, vehicles 
accounted for $249 million of the 
total value of items distributed, but 
that’s simply because they cost 
more outright than electrical wires, 
which still managed to double the 
total value of weapons transferred 
that year at more than $12 million. 
Weapons were also outpaced by 
medical equipment, which 
represented more than $11 million, 
as well as clothing and uniforms, 
which made up nearly $19 million 
collectively. 22 
 To write off 1033 
completely because of the 
controversy surrounding weaponry 
is to miss the point of the program 
itself. At its core, it’s a means of 
preventing waste by the DOD and 
providing police with provisions 
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that they can’t afford but 
nonetheless need. Ideally, 
police departments will never 
need to use the weapons and 
armored vehicles they acquire, 
but even if that future comes 
true, they will always need the 
basic tools to run an office and 
maintain a presence. Currently, 
the 1033 program is the only way 
that necessity can be met. 
 Regardless of the 
program’s benefits, it’s too 
involved with perceptions of public 
safety to escape emotional 
rhetoric. Because security is an 
issue that no politician wants to 
seem soft on but happens to be 
one heavily tied up in racial and 
class issues, police militarization 
has historically been a political 
third rail. However, in response to 
Ferguson, prominent members of 
both major parties called for 
reform. President Barack Obama 
addressed the issue by calling for 
a full review of 1033, declaring that 
“[t]here is a big difference between 
our military and our local law 
enforcement. And we don't want 
those lines blurred. That would be 
contrary to our traditions.”23 The 
President didn’t specify which 
aspects of 1033 he would like to 
see changed or if he would 
consider removing it altogether, 
but his opponents were much less 
ambiguous. In a piece for Time, 
Sen. Rand Paul (R- Ky) argued 
that the federal government should 
work with local police to reduce 
crime but should avoid helping 
“municipal governments build what 
are essentially small armies — 
where police departments 
compete to acquire military gear 
that goes far beyond what most of 
Americans think of as law 
enforcement.” 24 
Calls for reform increased 
following the revelation that police 
departments censured by the 
Justice Department for civil rights 
violations remained capable of 
applying for 1033 equipment. Most 
of these censures are resolved 
with consent decrees, wherein the 
department commits to certain 
outlined reforms, but many go 
unchecked. Attacks were levied at 
the DOD, which admitted that civil 
issues weren’t accounted for when 
providing equipment through the 
DLA, and at the Justice 
Department, which was accused 
of being lenient with their 
crackdown on such violations.25  
While many expected the 
discussion to fade away once 
Ferguson had begun to calm 
down, a bipartisan team of House 
lawmakers went forward with a 
plan to reform 1033. By restricting 
1033 from distributing some of the 
more controversial and dangerous 
weaponry, such as grenade 
launchers and certain armored 
vehicles, Reps. Hank Johnson (D-
Ga.) and Raúl Labrador (R-Idaho) 
hoped to curb police violence. 
Their bill, the Stop Militarizing Law 
Enforcement Act of 2014, also 
includes an outline for new 
reporting systems that would 
further limit waste and losses of 
equipment.26 The Senate was also 
proactive, with Sen. Claire 
McCaskill (D-Mo.) calling for DLA 
leaders to be brought in for 
hearings before the Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee in order to ensure 
tighter regulation.27 
 The DLA does suspend 
states from the program if there 
are consistent issues with 
reporting lost or stolen equipment, 
and the states of North Carolina 
and Alabama are currently in such 
a predicament.28 There’s also the 
DLA’s condition that all militaristic 
equipment be used in some way 
within one year of being received 
or be revoked. This is useful in 
making sure that gear isn’t sitting 
Because security is an issue that no 
politician wants to seem soft on but 
happens to be one heavily tied up in racial 
and class issues, police militarization has 
historically been a political third rail. 
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in closets forever, but it also 
pushed departments to improperly 
use equipment in order to retain it, 
such as the use of heavily armed 
SWAT teams to serve private 
home search warrants. 
 It makes sense for people 
to want their police departments to 
be as strong as possible because, 
presumably, that will make the 
community safer. But when that 
sense of protection can transform 
into a scene resembling a war 
zone in the span of a day, it sends 
out the opposite message. Heavily 
armed SWAT officers storming 
into homes for simple search 
warrants and gigantic military 
vehicles sitting watchfully in front 
of Ohio State University football 
games don’t engender trust and 
support – they make people 
paranoid. For as much good as 
the 1033 program does for police 
departments on a practical level, it 
is killing them on the public 
relations front. Law enforcement is 
most effective when it creates the 
sense that crimes are 
unnecessary, but violence begets 
violence, and when tear gas is 
freely and endlessly thrown into 
crowds because it happened to be 
subsidized, all that can come in 
return is anger. 
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